Perfect deterrence
An important and timely contribution to international relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors offer a new approach to deterrence - Perfect Deterrence Theory - which they apply unil...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge,UK New York
Cambridge University Press
2000
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| Series: | Cambridge studies in international relations
72 |
| Subjects: | |
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| Summary: | An important and timely contribution to international relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors offer a new approach to deterrence - Perfect Deterrence Theory - which they apply unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Responses. The authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. With the application of deterrence theory on diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject. |
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| Physical Description: | xxii,414 pages illustration 24cm |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| ISBN: | 9780521787130(pbk) 0521787130(pbk) 0521781744(hbk) |