Perfect deterrence
An important and timely contribution to international relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors offer a new approach to deterrence - Perfect Deterrence Theory - which they apply unil...
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge,UK New York
Cambridge University Press
2000
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| Series: | Cambridge studies in international relations
72 |
| Subjects: | |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Zagare, Frank C. |e author | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Perfect deterrence |c Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge,UK |a New York |b Cambridge University Press |c 2000 | |
| 264 | 4 | |c © 2000 | |
| 300 | |a xxii,414 pages |b illustration |c 24cm | ||
| 336 | |a text |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a unmediated |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a volume |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Cambridge studies in international relations |v 72 | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
| 505 | |a 1 Classical deterrence theory -- 2 Rationality and deterrence -- 3 Credibility and deterrence -- 4 Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- 5 Unilateral deterrence -- 6 Modelling extended deterrence -- 7 Modelling massive retaliation -- 8 Modelling flexible response -- 9 Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- 10 Perfect deterrence theory | ||
| 520 | |a An important and timely contribution to international relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors offer a new approach to deterrence - Perfect Deterrence Theory - which they apply unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Responses. The authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. With the application of deterrence theory on diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject. | ||
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| 650 | 0 | |a Deterrence (Strategy) | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Kilgour, D. Marc |e author | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Cambridge studies in international relations |v 72 | |
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