Perfect deterrence

An important and timely contribution to international relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors offer a new approach to deterrence - Perfect Deterrence Theory - which they apply unil...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Zagare, Frank C. (Author), Kilgour, D. Marc (Author)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cambridge,UK New York Cambridge University Press 2000
Series:Cambridge studies in international relations 72
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Table of Contents:
  • 1 Classical deterrence theory
  • 2 Rationality and deterrence
  • 3 Credibility and deterrence
  • 4 Uncertainty and mutual deterrence
  • 5 Unilateral deterrence
  • 6 Modelling extended deterrence
  • 7 Modelling massive retaliation
  • 8 Modelling flexible response
  • 9 Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence
  • 10 Perfect deterrence theory